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1  Introduction 
 
The third generation crisis literature emphasizes financial fragility as an important factor 
in turning a crisis into a major one (Corsetti et al. 1998a, 1998b, Radelet and Sachs 1998, 
Kaminsky  and  Reinhart  1999).  In  particular  this  literature  points  out  that  balance  sheet 
problems in the banking and/or corporate sector work to increase the prospect of insolvency 
and can be a trigger for domestic  and external investors to reassess their willingness to 
finance  a  country.  Dornbusch  (2001)  emphasizes  three  sources  of  vulnerability:  a 
substantially  misaligned  exchange  rate,  balance  sheet  problems  in  the  form  of 
nonperforming loans and balance sheet problems in the form of mismatched exposures. The 
last of these sources includes maturity mismatches as well as currency mismatches. These 
misalignments or mismatches become explosive when there is a perception that the current 
exchange rate is not sustainable or that debtors will not be able to meet their liabilities.  
In  this  paper  we  investigate  whether  Turkish  banks  with  worsening  indicators  of 
financial fragility were subject to market monitoring
1 during the years prior to the crisis. In 
November 2000 Turkey went through a liquidity squeeze that ended in a currency crisis in 
February 2001. This was the worst crisis Turkey experienced in its post-war history (Özkan 
2005). While a weak external and fiscal position were at the root of the crisis, most analysts 
point to the fragility of the banking sector, in terms of maturity and currency mismatches, as 
a factor that increased the magnitude of the crisis. To the best of our knowledge this is the 
first  paper  that  investigates  market’s  reaction  to  changes  in  currency  and  maturity 
mismatches in an emerging economy. 
                                                 
1 We refer to market monitoring in the context of Bliss and Flannery (2002) who emphasize that effective 
market discipline has two different components. The first one is investors’ ability to accurately assess the 
condition of a firm (market monitoring). The second one is investors’ ability to actually affect managerial 
actions (influencing). Our empirical tests address the first component of market discipline, monitoring.   2   
 
Specifically, we address the following questions. Did the stock market react to changes 
in indicators of financial fragility at the time of disclosure of banks’ financial statements? 
And  does  the  quality  and  timeliness  of  the  disclosure  affect  market  reaction?  Finding 
answers to these questions will help us understand which disclosure practices improve the 
ability of the market to assess the banks’ financial condition. Moreover it will allow us to 
contribute  to  a  recent  policy  debate  on  whether  the  existence  of  market  monitoring  is 
sufficient to guarantee that the actions of bank managers are influenced by security holders’ 
reactions, contributing in this way to the safety and soundness of the banking system. 
The case of Turkey presents several characteristics that make it ideal for our purposes. 
First, before November 2000, the Turkish banking system presented clear signs of financial 
fragility. Turkish banks were borrowing heavily in foreign currency, while lending in local 
currency. In addition to the increased currency risk, banks’ combined liquidity-interest rate 
risk from domestic funding also rose, because the local currency lending was mostly at fixed 
rates and at relatively longer maturities, which was partly financed in the daily repo market
2. 
Second,  16  private  Turkish  banks  were  publicly  traded  in  the  Istanbul  Stock  Exchange 
during our sample period, allowing us to test for market monitoring. They represent almost 
40% of the assets of the industry in the year 2000. Finally, disclosure policy was enhanced 
during the period. In 1995 the Turkish Capital Markets Board required publicly traded firms 
to disclose additional information with their financial statements that allowed investors to 
calculate more precise measures of maturity gaps and currency mismatches. Moreover in 
1999 problems in the Turkish banking sector led to the enactment of the Banks Act 4389
3 
                                                 
2 Table 1 and 2 describe the structure of assets and liabilities in the Turkish banking sector before the year 
2001. 
3 Amended by Act No. 4491 
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followed  by  the  establishment  of  an  autonomous  body,  The  Banking  Regulation  and 
Supervision  Agency  (BRSA).  The  new  regulation  brought  considerable  changes  in  the 
disclosure requirements of banks, including the requirement of disclosing risk management 
procedures (which was not compulsory before) and improvements in the disclosure of non-
performing loans. With the new regulation, if one loan was non-performing, other loans of 
the same customer had to be classified also as non-performing (Barth, Caprio and Levine, 
2001). 
Our  paper  provides  evidence  that  during  the  years  before  the  crisis  stock  market 
participants  monitored  the  banking  system.  We  find  significant  negative  reactions  to  all 
indicators of financial fragility. Specifically, the impact of a positive maturity gap, when 
interest rates were expected to rise, was negative and significant (abnormal returns fell on 
average 37 basis points with a one-month increase in maturity gap). Stock returns were also 
sensitive  to  increases  in  currency  mismatch  measured  as the  change  with  respect to  the 
previous quarter in the  percentage of net foreign exchange liabilities on total assets. An 
increase of 1% in the mismatch drove abnormal returns down by 25 basis points. Finally, an 
increase in non-performing loans also significantly reduced abnormal returns.  
As  expected,  and  consistent  with  previous  literature  on  earnings  announcements  (La 
Porta et al. (1997), Sivakumar and Waymire (1993)), we find a positive relationship between 
abnormal returns and changes in earnings. Interestingly, the positive reaction to earnings 
depended  negatively  on  the  magnitude  of  the  maturity  mismatch.  Overall,  our  results 
indicate that while shareholders reacted positively to news about increases in current profits, 
they  were  also  concerned  about the  negative  impact that  the  mismatches  could  have  on 
future profits.    4   
 
We are also interested in how the quality and timeliness of the disclosure affected market 
reaction.  We  find  that  after  the  passage  of  the  Banks  Act  in  1999  that  introduced 
considerable improvements in the way non-performing loans had to be reported, the stock 
market sensitivity to changes in this ratio increased significantly. In fact, once we allow the 
coefficient to change with the passage of the law, we find that it is only after 1999 that this 
financial fragility indicator becomes informative. We are also concerned about the reporting 
lag  (days  between  the  end  of  the  quarter  and  disclosure  date)  and  how  this  affects  the 
usefulness of financial statements. In fact, accounting principles such as the ones developed 
by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), require that financial statements be 
both reliable and relevant. In particular we notice that for the second and fourth quarters 
when the financial statements are audited the lag is larger (on average 47 days as opposed to 
31 days). We find that only the statements corresponding to the non-audit quarters (the ones 
with  shorter  reporting  lag)  were  informative,  showing  that  there  is  a  tradeoff  between 
accuracy  and  relevance,  and  indicating  the  need  of  improving  the  timeliness  of  audited 
statements.  
Our paper is related to the recent literature on bank disclosure and market discipline. It is 
argued  that  increased  transparency  should  reduce  the  magnitude  and  frequency  of  bank 
problems,  as  long  as  enhanced  disclosure  allows  market  participants  to  impose  market 
discipline earlier and more effectively. In fact there is empirical evidence in this direction. 
Tadesse (2005) finds that banking crises are less likely in countries with regulatory regimes 
that  require  extensive  bank  disclosure  and  stringent  auditing.  Also,  Nier  and  Baumann 
(2006)  in  a  cross-country  study  find  that  greater  information  disclosure  and  uninsured 
liabilities induce banks to hold larger capital buffers leading to lower default risk. However, 
they  also  find  that  an  extensive  government  safety  net  and  lower  levels  of  interbank   5   
 
competition weaken the efficacy of market forces. Other papers also warn about relying only 
on  market  forces.  Jordan,  Peek  and  Rosengren  (2000)  provide  evidence  that  market 
participants find supervisory information important in the pricing of  US bank securities, 
especially  for  banks  that  were  not  fully  informing  their  true  condition  in  their  prior 
disclosures.
4 In this same spirit Bliss and Flannery (2002) in their study of US banks find it 
hard  to  conclude  that  market  forces  encourage  bank  management  to  adopt  safer  bank 
practices.  Their  methodology  does  not  provide  strong  evidence  that  investors  regularly 
influence managerial actions. While Nier and Baumann (2006) stress that the effectiveness 
of  market  discipline  depends  on  the  regulatory  environment,  both  Jordan,  Peek  and 
Rosengren (2000) and Bliss and Flannery (2002) point to the need of supervisors retaining 
the responsibility for influencing managerial actions. Our paper also points in this direction. 
Even if we find evidence of the existence of monitoring of Turkish private banks from the 
stock market, and given the magnitude of the crisis that unfolded afterwards, we have to 
conclude that this was not enough to correct the problems. For example, three banks in our 
sample  failed  in  1999-2000.  Two  of  these  banks  reported  the  highest  average  levels  of 
maturity and currency mismatch respectively during the sample period. In fact, monitoring 
was  not  strong  enough  (there  was  no  market  discipline  from  debt  given  that  deposit 
insurance  was  complete),  and  there  were  important  weaknesses  in  the  supervisory  and 
regulatory framework that exacerbated moral hazard problems. We discuss them in the last 
section. In summary, our study suggests that the finding of reaction of securities prices to 
financial fragility indicators should not be taken as sufficient evidence of banks’ safety and 
soundness. 
                                                 
4 Specifically, they analyze the information content of adverse supervisory evaluation of banks (also known as 
formal actions) that reveal to the public that the bank is deeply troubled, and that require the bank to take 
remedial actions.    6   
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the data and 
the  methodology.  We  present  the  main  estimation  results  in  section  3,  followed  with 
robustness tests in section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 2  Data and Methodology 
2.1  Data source and sample selection 
Our  study  uses  quarterly  accounting  information  and  stock  price  information  for  12 
commercial Turkish banks listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange between 1992 and 2001. 
From the total of 16 banks publicly listed in Turkey, we exclude two development banks that 
do not collect deposits, and two commercial banks due to non-availability of data. The 12 
banks  represent  37%  of  the  assets  of  the  industry  in  the  year  2000.  The  sample  is  an 
unbalanced panel since two banks went public after 1995, and three banks were delisted, two 
in 1999 and another one in 2000. We exclude disclosure events after the third quarter of 
2001  because,  starting  in  December  2001,  the  Capital  Markets  Board  required  financial 
statements to be reported on an inflation-adjusted basis
5, preventing comparability with the 
previous statements. 
We  obtain  quarterly  accounting  information  for  the  banks, their disclosure dates,  the 
daily bank stock prices, and the market index (ISE National-100), directly from the Istanbul 
Stock Exchange. Stock prices of banks are daily closing prices, and we adjust returns for 
dividends and stock splits. We eliminate 26 observations that experience confounding events 
such  as  dividend  payments  and  stock  splits,  and  three  observations  where  the  date  of 
disclosure is not available. The final sample includes 333 bank-quarter observations for the 
                                                 
5 Capital Markets Board Regulation, Serial: XI, No:20, 28/11/2001   7   
 
sample period 1992-2001. However for three of our main explanatory variables there is only 
detailed information since 1995
6. Therefore for most of our main specifications, our sample 
includes  199  bank-quarter  observations.  We  give  detailed  information  on  the  data 
availability for each bank in Table A1, and a list of all disclosure dates for the 12 banks 
during the sample period in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
2.2   Methodology 
The methodology applied in this study is based on the market-adjusted-return model. We 
adjust the rate of return on the bank stock by subtracting the return on the market index from 
the bank stock return. When computing abnormal returns using the market model instead, we 
have to estimate pre-event periods, which overlap with the previous events. To have a clean 
measure, we choose the market-adjusted-return model as our mainline, since this approach 
does not require an estimation period to obtain parameter estimates. However in section 4, 
we use the market model and show that our results are robust to the use of this alternative 
methodology.  
As the market portfolio, we use the Istanbul Stock Exchange National-100 index (ISE 
National-100) that includes 100 companies with the highest market values and the highest 
daily average trading volumes. Next we compute the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) 
over a number of days,  [ ] 1 2 , t t  for n securities. We first examine the event window (-1, 0). 
Since the financial statements are disclosed on day 0 in the morning, the new information 
should be reflected in the stock prices immediately on the event day. However, we cannot 
eliminate the possibility of leakage of information before the disclosure day. Therefore we 
also allow for a broader event window that includes 5 trading days before the event day. 
                                                 
6 We explain this in detail in Section 2.3   8   
 
We also need to correct for potential cross-correlation of abnormal returns, given that 
disclosure  dates  are  the  same  for  some  banks  for  some  quarters  (see  Table  A2).  Such 
clustering of announcement dates requires special adjustments both in the univariate tests as 
well as in cross-sectional regressions. To correct for the clustering problem in the univariate 
tests we follow the technique summarized in Jaffe (1974), Collins and Dent (1984) and in 
Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997). This technique eliminates the clustering problem by 
first aggregating abnormal returns corresponding to the same calendar time into portfolios. 
Mean and standard deviation of returns are then calculated across portfolios, which do not 
face a clustering problem.  
To  handle  the  clustering  problem  in  cross-sectional  regressions,  we  follow  Petersen 
(2006). He shows that in the presence of a time effect (correlation across firms), “standard 
errors clustered by time” produce unbiased standard errors. However, clustering by time is 
an appropriate method only when there are a sufficient number of clusters. The bias in the 
clustered standard error estimates declines with the number of clusters, dropping from 27 
percent when there are five clusters to one percent when there are 100 clusters.   
In our analysis we apply a pooled OLS with White standard errors, which are also robust 
to within cluster correlation (clustered or Rogers standard errors).
7 We do this given that it is 
possible  that  our  abnormal  returns  corresponding  to  the  same  disclosure  dates  are 
contemporaneously correlated across banks. The number of clusters in our main regressions 
ranges from 246 to 107.
 8 Because it is higher than 100 we are confident that underestimation 
of true standard errors is not a problem in our regressions.   
                                                 
7 We cannot use Fama-McBeth because the size of our sample is too small. 
8 The average number of banks disclosing on the same calendar date is 2.6.   9   
 
2.3  Variable Definitions 
Using  US  data,  Beaver  et  al.  (1989),  Flannery  and  James,  (1984a  and  1984b)  and 
Schrand (1997) find that that the disclosure of financial statements along with supplemental 
data regarding default risk and interest rate risk explain variation in banks’ stock prices. In 
line  with  this,  our  objective  is  to  test  whether  abnormal  returns  of  Turkish  banks  at 
disclosure  can  be  explained  by  changes  in  financial  fragility  variables,  controlling  for 
changes  in  traditional  variables  such  as  earnings.
9  Ideally,  we  would  build  measures  of 
unexpected changes in the explanatory variables. However, unfortunately there is no data 
available  that  can  proxy  for  the  expected  values  of  the  explanatory  variables,  such  as 
analysts  quarterly  forecasts  of  profits  of  Turkish  banks,  or  quarterly  forecasts  of  bank 
specific measures of maturity or currency mismatches. As a second best, we take quarterly 
changes in variables (for earnings, yearly changes in quarterly earnings). We take quarterly 
changes, because Turkish banks disclose financial information quarterly. Specifically, our 
explanatory  variables  for  financial  fragility  are  the  quarterly  changes  in  non-performing 
loans,  and  in  measures  of  maturity  and  currency  mismatch.  The  data  for  maturity  and 
currency mismatch is hand-collected from the footnotes of financial statements.  We also 
control  for  changes  in  profitability  and  in  banks’  lending  behaviour  (e.g.  investing  in 
government bonds instead of lending to corporations).  
Non-performing loans changes (NPL) is defined as the as the change with respect to the 
previous quarter in the percentage of non-performing loans on total loans. We expect NPL to 
have a negative effect on abnormal returns. 
                                                 
9 La Porta et al. (1997), Sivakumar and Waymire (1993) among others, show that surprises in earnings 
announcements have a significant impact on abnormal returns. 
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Maturity  mismatch  changes  (Maturity)  is  measured  as  quarterly  changes  in  maturity 
gaps. We follow Saunders and Cornett (2003, p177) to compute the gaps. Letting  A M  be the 
weighted average maturity of a bank’s assets and  L M  the weighted average maturity of a 
bank’s liabilities, the maturity gap is calculated as the difference between  A M  and  L M . 
Such that: 
1 1 2 2 ..... i i i i i in in M w M w M w M = + + +  
where 
i M  =  the weighted average maturity of a bank’s assets (liabilities), i=A or L , 
ij w  =  the importance of each asset (liability) in the asset (liability) portfolio as measured by 
the book value of that asset (liability) position relative to the book value of all assets 
(liabilities), 
ij M  = the maturity of the jth asset (liability), j=1, …., n. 
This measure of interest rate risk accounts both for an income effect and a market value 
effect on assets and liabilities of interest rate changes.
10 We obtain the data for Maturity from 
the footnotes of the financial statements, available after 1995. The data is classified as assets 
and liabilities with maturities shorter than three months, three months to one year, and longer 
than one year.  
The sign of the impact of maturity mismatch on abnormal returns depends on whether 
interest rates are expected to increase or decrease. To capture this, we interact Maturity with 
two  dummy  variables:  DI_mat  equal  to  1  if  interest  rates  are  expected  to  increase,  0 
otherwise; and DD_mat equal to 1 if interest rates are expected to decrease, 0 otherwise. 
                                                 
10 A duration gap, by also accounting for the timing of the arrival of cash flows of assets and liabilities, would 
be  a  more  precise  measure.  However  it  is  not  possible  to  construct  it  with  the  data  from  the  financial 
statements.   11   
 
Unfortunately we do not have data on the yield curve at each disclosure date. As a proxy for 
the sign of the expected change in interest rates, we take the sign of the ex-post three-month 
change in the deposit interest rate (we subtract the interest rate of the disclosure date from 
the interest rate three months later). We choose the three-month ex-post change because the 
median maturity of liabilities in our sample is 3 months, indicating that on average liabilities 
were repriced in the next 3 months following disclosure. However we also explore the 4 
months, and 6 months change. Interest rate information, defined as average monthly deposit 
rates  of  the  banking  industry,  is  provided  by  the  Central  Bank  of  Turkey.  We  expect 
Maturity to negatively affect abnormal returns when interest rates are expected to increase, 
while affecting them positively when interest rates are expected to fall. 
We measure currency mismatch changes (Currency) as the change with respect to the 
previous  quarter  in  the  percentage  of  net  foreign  exchange  liabilities  (foreign  exchange 
liabilities minus foreign exchange assets) on total assets. Before the second quarter of 2000 
there  are  reporting  differences  across  banks.
11  While  some  banks  provide  additional 
information  on  forward  agreements  when  reporting  their  assets  and  liabilities  in  foreign 
currency,  others  only  report  on-balance  sheet  information.  Considering  that  including 
forward agreements gives a more realistic picture about banks'  foreign currency risk, for the 
analysis of currency mismatch we run our regressions with only 8 banks that were consistent 
in  reporting  both  on  balance  sheet  and  off  balance  sheet  information  during  the  whole 
period.  
The sign of the impact of currency mismatch on abnormal returns depends on whether 
the lira is expected to depreciate or appreciate against the dollar. To capture this, we interact 
                                                 
11 Starting in the second quarter of 2000, all banks had to include both on-and off-balance sheet information 
when reporting their assets and liabilities in foreign currency.   12   
 
Currency with two dummy variables: DI_curr equal to 1 if the Turkish lira is expected to 
depreciate against the dollar, 0 otherwise; and DD_curr equal to 1 if Turkish lira is expected 
to appreciate, 0 otherwise. We follow the same procedure as for interest rates and, as a proxy 
for the sign of the expected change in the value of the lira, we take the sign of the ex-post 
three-month change in the exchange rate (we subtract the exchange rate of the disclosure 
date from the exchange rate three months later). We should note however that the lira shows 
a  trend  of  depreciation  in  nominal  terms  during  our  entire  sample  period  (for  only  two 
quarters DI_curr is equal to 0). Therefore we expect Currency to have a negative effect on 
abnormal equity returns when the lira is expected to depreciate, and not to have any effect 
when the lira is expected to appreciate. 
Government securities changes (GS) is the change with respect to the previous quarter, 
in  the  percentage  of  government  security  holdings  on  total  assets.  Government  security 
holdings are reported under the items “Securities” and “Affiliated Securities” on the balance 
sheet. We construct GS with the help of the information obtained from the footnotes on these 
items. The impact of GS on abnormal returns may be positive or negative. We expect the 
sign  of  the  variable  to  be  positive  if  an  increase  in  government  securities  creates  an 
expectation  of  regulatory  forbearance
12.  On  the  other  hand,  increases  in  government 
securities could be perceived as related to maturity and currency mismatch. Therefore, if the 
variable is capturing a part of the effect of maturity and currency mismatch, we expect a 
negative impact on abnormal returns. 
                                                 
12 The Treasury was empowered to inspect banks financial standing. Özkan (2005) argues that given the 
Treasury’s need to finance the public sector, the Treasury had less incentive to be strict in regulating banks that 
held large amounts of government securities. 
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Earnings  changes  (Earnings)  is  the  change  with  respect  to  the  same  quarter  of  the 
previous  year,  in  the  percentage  of  quarterly  earnings  (before  extraordinary  items)  over 
market value of equity. Following the accounting literature and for seasonality reasons, we 
employ yearly changes rather than quarterly changes. We recognize that a better variable 
would be one calculated using analysts forecasts of bank profits as a measure of expected 
earnings, and subtracting each quarter earnings forecast from the current quarter earnings. 
However that information is not available.  
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for all variables including CARs for the event 
window (-1, 0). 
  
3  Results 
3.1  Univariate tests 
Table 4 reports average CARs for different groups of variables. Specifically, we report 
the CAR mean values for each explanatory variable for two groups, good news and bad 
news. In the case of non-performing loans, for example, the good news group corresponds to 
events when the bank discloses a decrease in the ratio, and the bad news group corresponds 
to  events  when  the  bank  discloses  an  increase  in  the  ratio.  We  then  test  whether  the 
difference in the means of abnormal returns between the good news group and bad news 
group is significantly positive (one-tail test). As explained in section 2.2, to correct for the 
clustering problem, we first aggregate abnormal returns corresponding to the same calendar 
day  into  a  portfolio.  Mean  and  standard  deviation  of  returns  are  then  calculated  across 
portfolios, which do not face a clustering problem.    14   
 
We find that good news such as decreases in non-performing loans, decreases in currency 
mismatch  (when  the lira  is  expected  to  depreciate),  and  decreases  in maturity  mismatch 
(when interest rates are expected to increase) are all associated with larger mean abnormal 
returns  than  the  respective  bad  news  group.  However  the  difference  of  means  test  is 
significant only for NPL. Earnings also behaves as expected with increases in earnings being 
associated with larger abnormal returns than decreases in earnings.  
Because abnormal returns in the event day are the result of all the information disclosed 
in the balance sheet that may include both good and bad news, we are not surprised about the 
lack of significance of the difference-of-means tests. Therefore we now turn to a  cross-
sectional analysis that will allow us to test the sensitivity of stock prices to each of the 
financial indicators. 
 
3.2  Cross-sectional analysis 
Table 5 reports the estimation results for different specifications for the event window (-
1,  0).  All  regressions  are  pooled  OLS,  with  standard  errors  that  are  robust  to 
heteroskedasticity and within cluster correlation.
13 
Specification 1 covers the whole sample period but includes only Government Securities 
(GS) and Earnings since the data for other variables is not available before 1995. Earnings 
has a positive and statistically significant effect, implying that a 1% increase in the Earnings 
ratio is expected to cause an abnormal stock return of 10.4 basis points, ceteris paribus. GS 
does not have an impact on abnormal returns. These results are robust to the inclusion of our 
                                                 
13 We explain this in detail in Section 2.2   15   
 
financial fragility variables. This is what we do next, we focus on the sensitivity of abnormal 
returns to NPL, Maturity and Currency. 
In specification 2 we add NPL and Maturity to the variables of specification 1. We first 
exclude  Currency  because  the  introduction  of  this  variable  reduces  the  number  of 
observations given that we can only calculate it for eight banks as explained in Section 2.3. 
However,  we  do  include  the  three  financial  fragility  variables  in  specification  5.  In 
specification 3 we add to specification 2 an interaction term of NPL with a dummy variable 
(Banks Act) equal to 1 after the year 1999, 0 otherwise. In 1999 the problems in the Turkish 
banking sector led to the enactment of the Banks Act 4389
14 followed by the establishment 
of an autonomous body, The Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA). The 
new regulation brought considerable changes in the disclosure requirements of banks, and it 
also improved the transparency of the reporting of non-performing loans. Specifically, with 
the new regulation, if one loan was non-performing, other loans of the same customer had to 
be  classified  also  as  non-performing  (Barth,  Caprio  and  Levine,  2001).  We  expect  this 
interaction  term  to  be  negative  if  the  measure  of  non-performing  loans  becomes  more 
informative after 1999.  
The  results  related to  NPL  are  as  expected.  The variable  is  significantly  negative  in 
specification  2.  Moreover  the  interaction  term  in  specification  3  is  negatively  related  to 
CARs, and the total effect of NPL when the dummy for Banks Act equals to 1 is even 
stronger, with a value of -1.24 and significant at the 5 percent level. 
The  interaction  term  of  Maturity  with  the  first  categorical  variable  DI_mat  (dummy 
equal  to  1  when  interest  rates  are  expected  to  increase,  0  otherwise)  is  negative  in  all 
                                                 
14 Amended by Act No. 4491 
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specifications as expected. The variable is significant in specification 2, and the p-value is 
very  close  to  10  percent  in  specification  3.  A  one-month  increase  in  Maturity,  leads  to 
negative  abnormal  returns  ranging  from  35  to  43  basis  points.  Maturity  interacted  with 
DD_mat (dummy equal to 1 when interest rates are expected to decrease, 0 otherwise) is not 
significant in any specification. 
15 
In specification 4, we introduce two new interaction terms of Earnings with the Maturity 
variables.  The  purpose  is  to  test  whether  the  sensitivity of  abnormal  returns  to  earnings 
depends  on  the  magnitudes  of  the  financial  fragility  variables.  Our  results  point  in  this 
direction.  The  positive  and  significant  effect  of  Earnings  on  abnormal  returns  and  the 
negative and significant interaction term of Earnings and Maturity (when interest rates are 
expected to increase), suggest that shareholders’ positive reaction to increases in earnings is 
attenuated by large values of the maturity mismatch.  
Finally in specification 5, we add the currency variable to the other financial fragility 
variables.  We  interact  Currency  with  two  dummy  variables:  DI_curr  equal  to  1  if  the 
Turkish lira is expected to depreciate against the dollar, 0 otherwise; and DD_curr equal to 1 
if Turkish lira is expected to appreciate, 0 otherwise.  We note here that for all quarters 
except  for  two,  DI_curr  is  equal  to  1.  Our  results  show  that  Currency  interacted  with 
DI_curr is negatively significant at 10 percent level. An increase of 1% in the mismatch 
drove abnormal returns down by 25 basis points when the Turkish lira was expected to 
depreciate, supporting the hypothesis that shareholders reacted negatively to increases in 
currency mismatch.  
                                                 
15We also explore the 4 months and 6 months change in constructing the dummies for changes in interest rate 
expectations. The coefficient for Maturity interacted with DI_mat is still negative but insignificant.   17   
 
All  in  all  these  results  suggest  that  stock  market  participants  monitored  the  banking 
system and that they reacted negatively to adverse changes in financial fragility variables, 
showing concerns about the impact of these variables on future profits.  
Next, and in order to see how the quality of the disclosure affects stock prices, we split 
the sample into two groups according to whether the financial statements are audited or not, 
and re-estimate the model (see Table 6-Panel A). We do not include the specification with 
Currency due to the very low number of observations when the sample is split. For the 
second and fourth quarters when the financial statements are audited, only the coefficient for 
NPL is significant. However estimations with non-audit quarters result in larger effects of 
Earnings,  Maturity  interacted with  DI_mat,  and NPL compared  to the  findings  with  the 
entire sample. Not only do the coefficients reflect higher sensitivities in non-audit quarters, 
but they are also more significant. Moreover the explanatory power of the regressions of 
audit quarters is zero, while it ranges from 9% to 30% for non-audit quarters. In order to try 
to  explain  this  puzzling  result  we  calculate  reporting  lags  (number  of  days  between 
disclosure date and end of quarter) for audit versus non-audit quarters. The lag for audit 
quarters is on average 47 days while it is only 31 days for non-audit quarters. The longer the 
lag the less informative the financial statements are for the market. Therefore we re-estimate 
the model by splitting the sample according to the length of reporting lags (higher values 
than the medium reporting lag which is 40 days versus lower values than 40). The results are 
presented in Table 6-Panel B, which are extremely similar to the findings in Panel A in terms 
of explanatory power. This result indicates that the timeliness of disclosure is extremely 
important. Moreover it suggests a potential trade-off between accuracy and timeliness.   18   
 
Finally, we also allow for a broader event window that includes 5 trading days before the 
event day. However we do not find any evidence of information leakage leading to an earlier 
market reaction. 
 
4  Robustness checks 
In this section we first compute abnormal returns using the market model instead of the 
market-adjusted-return model. The estimation method using the market model is as follows. 
The rate of return on the share price of the bank i on day t is expressed as: 
it i i mt it R R a b e = + +  
where 
it R  = the return on security i on day t, 
mt R  = the return on a market portfolio of stocks on day t 
As the market portfolio, we use the Istanbul Stock Exchange National-100 index (ISE 
National-100). To estimate the market model parameters, we take an estimation period of 
250  days  before  each  event.  Additionally,  we  control  for  non-synchronous  trading  by 
including one lead and one lag of market returns: 
, , , 1 , 1 , i t i i m t m t m t i t R R R R a b g d e - + = + + + +  
We derive the estimates of daily Abnormal Returns (AR) using the following equation where 
we adjust the rate of return on the stock by subtracting the expected return from the actual 
return: 
, , , , 1 , 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) i t i t i i m t m t m t AR R R R R a b g d - + = - + + +  
After computing the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) with the estimates of daily 
ARs over two days for the event window (-1, 0), we re-estimate our main specifications. The   19   
 
estimation results are presented in Table 7 and are mainly unchanged compared to the results 
with CARs computed with the market-adjusted-return approach (Table 5). The results are 
even statistically stronger for Maturity when interest rates are expected to increase, which is 
now  significant  for  all  specifications.  On  the  other  hand,  the  coefficient  for  Currency 
interacted  with  DI_curr  (equal  to  1  when  the  Turkish  lira  is  expected  to  depreciate)  is 
statistically insignificant but still negative. 
We also estimate the market model without controlling for the lead and lagged values of 
market return. The estimation results using those CARs are similar to the results in Table 7. 
Our  final  robustness check  consists of  running the  same  regressions  excluding crisis 
quarters. Because some of the quarters in our sample correspond to crises periods, results 
could be mainly driven by these quarters.
16  If this were the case, our evidence would simply 
show that investors reacted too late. The results remain very similar implying that the market 
did not react too late, and was in fact monitoring the banks. We choose not to report these 
regressions but results are available upon request. 
 
5  Conclusion and discussion 
 
In November 2000, Turkey experienced a liquidity squeeze followed by a currency crisis 
in  February  2001.  Many  studies  argue  that  the  fragility  of  the  Turkish  banking  system 
deepened the magnitude of the crisis. In this paper, we examine the monitoring ability of the 
market  by  exploring  how  shareholders  reacted  to  changes  in  their  banks’  measures  of 
financial fragility. Consistent with previous literature on earnings, we find that shareholders 
                                                 
16 We exclude 1993-Q4 and 1994-Q1 referring to 1994 exchange rate crisis, and all quarters between 2000-Q3 
and 2001-Q3.   20   
 
reacted positively to increases in earnings. More importantly, we find evidence of negative 
reactions  to  indicators  of  financial  fragility  such  as  increases  in  maturity  mismatches, 
currency mismatches, and in non-performing loans, showing shareholders concerns about 
their impact on future profits. We are also interested in how the quality and timeliness of the 
disclosure affected market reaction. We find that improvements in disclosure requirements, 
such  as  the Banks  Act  in  1999,  increased  the informativeness  of  accounting  statements. 
Moreover we find that audited statements with larger reporting lags are not informative, 
pointing to the need of improving their timeliness. 
Recent papers stress that the effectiveness of market discipline depends on the regulatory 
environment and point to the need of supervisors retaining the responsibility for influencing 
managerial actions. Our paper also points in this direction. Even if we find evidence of the 
existence of monitoring of Turkish private banks from the stock market, and given the crisis 
that unfolded afterwards, we have to conclude that this was not enough to guarantee their 
soundness. For example, two banks in our sample that reported the highest average levels of 
maturity and currency mismatch failed in 1999-2000. In fact important weaknesses in the 
Turkish institutional framework exacerbated moral hazard problems. Özkan (2005) gives a 
detailed account. The Treasury, the Central Bank and the Capital Markets Board were all 
involved in supervising agents in the financial sector creating large conflicts of interest.
17 
The existence of full deposit insurance eliminated the incentives of depositors to monitor 
banks’ actions. Moreover state banks, that represented approximately 40% of the system, 
were used to channel preferential credits to certain groups. This practice together with the 
fact that private banks were holders of large amounts of government securities, created great 
                                                 
17 Before the formation of the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA) in June 1999, the Treasury 
and the Central Bank conducted regulatory and supervisory actions on the banking sector.    21   
 
expectations of regulatory forbearance, exacerbating moral hazard incentives. The results of 
our paper highlight the fact that a sound institutional framework is a necessary condition for 
any banking system to work properly and that only within such a framework can market 
monitoring  (together  with  regulatory  supervision)  play  a  key  role  in  disciplining  bank 
management. 
   22   
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Table 1: Foreign Exchange Position of Commercial Banks 
The table displays the ratio of Foreign Exchange Position to Shareholders’ Equity for commercial banks in the 
Turkish banking sector, including 43 Turkish banks and 18 foreign banks. Fx Position is defined as Foreign 
Exchange Liabilities minus Foreign Exchange Assets.  
 
Fx Position / Shareholders'  Equity    
(%) 
1988  -41.00 
1989  -17.40 
1990  43.20 
1991  48.00 
1992  85.70 
1993  106.10 
1994  22.40 
1995  76.80 
1996  55.30 
1997  91.90 
1998  138.80 
1999  476.60 
2000  259.50 





Table 2: Ratios in Turkish Banking Sector 
 
(%)  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Nonperforming Loans             
Nonperforming Loans / Total Loans  2.8  2.2  2.4  7.2  10.7  11.6 
             
Currency Mismatch             
FX Liabilities- FX Assets (billion $)             
              excluding off-the-balance sheet  3.0  2.5  5.0  8.4  13.2  17.4 
              including off-the-balance sheet  0.6  1.2  1.9  2.9  2.9  5.5 
             
Maturity Mismatch             
Liquid Assets / (Deposits + Non-deposit funds)  46.7  44.0  41.1  39.9  42.6  37.9 
Assets / Liabilities  
(with 3 months or shorter maturities) 
n/a  n/a  45.8  45.7  46.3  39.9 
Share of Deposits  
with 6 months or greater maturity in total deposits 
26.1  26.6  24.7  22.9  28.2  15.1 
Repos / (Liabilities + repos)  5.1  8.1  12.8  10.4  9.6  11.3 
Data Source: Central Bank and the Banks Association of Turkey (Özatay and Sak, 2002)   25   
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for changes  
The sample covers the time period between 1992/I and 2001/III for 12 Turkish commercial banks. The data is quarterly. 
CAR denotes the Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the event window (-1, 0). NPL is defined as quarterly changes in 
Non-performing Loans/Total Loans, Maturity as quarterly changes in gaps in months, Currency as quarterly changes in 
mismatch defined as FX Liabilities minus FX Assets to Total Assets and GS as quarterly changes in Government 
Securities/Total Assets. Earnings is defined as yearly (same quarter of the preceding year) changes in Net Income 
before Extraordinary Items / Market Value of Equity. 
 
    mean  median  sd  min  max 
CAR (-1, 0)  %  0.47  -0.07  6.00  -27.71  20.83 
NPL  %  0.08  0.00  1.02  -7.05  3.69 
Maturity  months  0.23  0.11  2.78  -11.72  12.41 
Currency  %  0.07  -0.08  3.54  -17.72  20.13 
GS  %  0.39  0.31  6.10  -24.84  28.20 
Earnings  %  -0.45  -0.65  9.62  -57.15  38.81 
 
 
Table 4: Mean difference tests for CARs Associated with Changes in Variables 
The sample covers the time period between 1992/I and 2001/III for 12 Turkish commercial banks. The data is quarterly. 
CAR denotes the Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the event window (-1, 0). NPL is defined as quarterly changes in 
Non-performing Loans/Total Loans, Maturity as quarterly changes in gaps in months, Currency as quarterly changes in 
mismatch defined as FX Liabilities minus FX Assets to Total Assets and GS as quarterly changes in Government 
Securities/Total Assets. Earnings is defined as yearly (same quarter of the preceding year) changes in Net Income 
before Extraordinary Items / Market Value of Equity. The sample is split into 2 groups where the changes in variables 
are good news and bad news respectively. The sample for Maturity and Currency changes is split further into two other 
groups.  For  Maturity,  where  interest  rates  are  expected  to  increase  (DI_mat=1)  and  to  decrease  (DI_mat=0).  For 
Currency, when the Turkish lira is expected to depreciate (DI_curr=1) and to appreciate (DI_curr=0). To calculate the 
sign of the interest rate (exchange rate) expectations, we take the sign of the ex-post three-month change in the average 
deposit interest rates (exchange rates). The analysis with currency position covers only 8 banks that were consistent in 
their reporting. The last two columns presents the t-test for the mean differences of CARs (-1,0) between two groups and 
the p-values for alternative hypothesis.  
 
Group  Obs  Mean    Group  Obs  Mean    mean difference 
t-value 
Ha: diff > 0 
Pr(T > t) 
Good News        Bad News           
NPL decreases  91  0.58    NPL increases  85  -0.52    1.45  0.07 
                   
DI_mat=1        DI_mat=1           
Maturity 
decreases 
23  1.79    Maturity increases  18  0.51    0.95  0.18 
DI_mat=0        DI_mat=0           
Maturity 
increases 
55  -0.35    Maturity 
decreases 
53  -0.22    0.13  0.55 
                   
DI_curr=1        DI_curr=1           
Currency 
decreases 
59  0.52    Currency 
increases 
55  -0.15    0.66  0.26 
DI_curr =0        DI_curr =0           
Currency 
increases 
5  2.35    Currency 
decreases 
2  -1.25    -0.64  0.28 
                   
GS decreases  128  0.50    GS increases  133  0.40    0.14  0.45 
                   
Earnings 
increases 
111  0.79    Earnings 
decreases 
135  -0.08    -1.20  0.12   26   
 
Table 5: Estimation Results  
The table displays the results of alternative specifications for the event window (-1, 0). The dependent variable is the 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR). The data is quarterly. NPL is defined as quarterly changes in Non-performing 
Loans/Total Loans, Maturity as quarterly changes in gaps in months, Currency as quarterly changes in mismatch defined 
as FX Liabilities minus FX Assets to Total Assets and GS as quarterly changes in Government Securities/Total Assets. 
Earnings is defined as yearly (same quarter of the preceding year) changes in Net Income before Extraordinary Items / 
Market Value of Equity. DI_mat denotes the dummy variable, equal to 1, if interest rates are expected to increase, and 
DD_mat if they are expected to decrease. DI_curr denotes the dummy variable, equal to 1, when the Turkish lira is 
expected to depreciate and DD_curr if the Turkish lira is expected to appreciate. To calculate the sign of the interest rate 
(exchange rate) expectations, we take the sign of the ex-post three-month change in the average deposit interest rates 
(exchange rates). Banks Act denotes the dummy equal to 1 after the introduction of new Banks Act. Specification 1 
covers the full sample for 12 banks and the time period 1992/II-2001/III. NPL, and Maturity and Currency are included 
in the next specifications due to non-availability of data before 1995. The last specification including Currency covers 
only  8  banks  that  were  consistent  in  their  reporting.  Regressions  are  pooled  OLS  with  standard  errors  robust  to 
heteroskedasticity and within cluster correlation. p- values are in parentheses. Asteriks indicate significance at the 10% 
(*), 5% (**) and 1% (***). 
   
NPL -0.800 * 0.099 -0.808 * -1.295 **
[0.076] [0.888] [0.080] [0.023]
NPL * Banks Act -1.344
[0.120]
Maturity * DI_mat -0.367 * -0.353 -0.425 ** -0.359
[0.094] [0.104] [0.025] [0.102]
Maturity * DD_mat -0.017 0.02 -0.032 0.145
[0.918] [0.900] [0.856] [0.457]
Earnings*Maturity * DI_mat -0.022 *
[0.071]






GS 0.039 0.056 0.037 0.041 0.071
[0.506] [0.362] [0.525] [0.496] [0.328]
Earnings 0.104 *** 0.098 * 0.088 * 0.100 ** 0.114 **
[0.005] [0.053] [0.078] [0.043] [0.046]
Constant 0.433 0.36 0.345 0.368 0.476
[0.181] [0.335] [0.352] [0.320] [0.299]
Total Impact NPL -1.245 **
[0.020]
Observations 333 199 199 199 138
Adjusted R-squared 0.026 0.032 0.039 0.039 0.064
(5) (1) (2) (3) (4)
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Table 6.A: The Impact of Audit  
The table displays the results for the event window (-1, 0). The dependent variable is the Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(CAR). “Audit” covers the second and fourth quarters where financial statements are audited. “No Audit” covers the first 
and third quarters. NPL is defined as quarterly changes in Non-performing Loans/Total Loans, Maturity as quarterly 
changes in gaps in months, and GS as quarterly changes in Government Securities/Total Assets. Earnings is defined as 
yearly (same quarter of the preceding year) changes in Net Income before Extraordinary Items / Market Value of Equity. 
DI_mat denotes the dummy variable, equal to 1, if interest rates are expected to increase, and DD_mat if they are 
expected to decrease. To calculate the sign of the interest rate expectations, we take the sign of the ex-post three-month 
change in the average deposit interest rates. Banks Act denotes the dummy equal to 1 after the introduction of new 
Banks Act. Specification 1 covers the full sample for 12 banks and the time period 1992/II-2001/III. NPL and Maturity 
are included in the next specifications due to non-availability of data before 1995. Regressions are pooled OLS with 
standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and within cluster correlation. p- values are in parentheses. Asteriks indicate 
significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***). 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
NPL -1.165 ** -1.007 -1.143 ** -0.426 0.894 -0.428
[0.035] [0.305] [0.035] [0.534] [0.211] [0.553]
NPL * Banks Act -0.210 -2.355 **
[0.863] [0.024]
Maturity * DI_mat -0.169 -0.168 -0.133 -0.827 ** -0.768 ** -0.855 ***
[0.311] [0.310] [0.441] [0.013] [0.023] [0.003]
Maturity * DD_mat 0.128 0.132 0.066 -0.399 * -0.348 -0.343
[0.635] [0.625] [0.836] [0.093] [0.148] [0.152]
Earnings*Maturity * DI_mat 0.008 -0.031 **
[0.453] [0.037]
Earnings*Maturity * DD_mat -0.022 0.018
[0.261] [0.535]
GS 0.076 0.054 0.052 0.050 -0.047 0.086 0.042 0.072
[0.268] [0.431] [0.451] [0.473] [0.607] [0.376] [0.605] [0.474]
Earnings 0.044 0.022 0.020 0.017 0.225 *** 0.257 *** 0.244 *** 0.208 ***
[0.303] [0.726] [0.753] [0.795] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.007]
Constant 0.048 0.095 0.092 -0.012 0.820* 0.582 0.576 0.540
[0.918] [0.865] [0.870] [0.983] [0.060] [0.228] [0.225] [0.286]
Total Impact NPL -1.217 * -1.461 *
[0.076] [0.070]
Observations 166 101 101 101 167 98 98 98
Adjusted R-squared 0 -0.01 -0.02 -0.014 0.09 0.158 0.185 0.161
AUDIT NO AUDIT
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Table 6.B: The Impact of Reporting Lags 
The table displays the results for the event window (-1, 0). The dependent variable is the Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(CAR). The sample is split according to the length of the reporting lags of financial statements. NPL is defined as 
quarterly changes in Non-performing Loans/Total Loans, Maturity as quarterly changes in gaps in months, and GS as 
quarterly changes in Government Securities/Total Assets. Earnings is defined as yearly (same quarter of the preceding 
year) changes in Net Income before Extraordinary Items / Market Value of Equity. DI_mat denotes the dummy variable, 
equal to 1, if interest rates are expected to increase, and DD_mat if they are expected to decrease. To calculate the sign of 
the interest rate expectations, we take the sign of the ex-post three-month change in the average deposit interest rates. 
Banks Act denotes the dummy equal to 1 after the introduction of new Banks Act. Specification 1 covers the full sample 
for 12 banks and the time period 1992/II-2001/III. NPL and Maturity are included in the next specifications due to non-
availability of data before 1995. Regressions are pooled OLS with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and within 
cluster correlation. p- values are in parentheses. Asteriks indicate significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***). 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
NPL -0.772 -0.145 -0.845 -0.421 1.060 -0.368
[0.161] [0.884] [0.140] [0.484] [0.412] [0.554]
NPL * Banks Act -0.986 -2.156
[0.397] [0.149]
Maturity * DI_mat -0.065 -0.052 -0.049 -1.292 *** -1.313 *** -1.213 **
[0.688] [0.750] [0.769] [0.000] [0.000] [0.026]
Maturity * DD_mat -0.254 -0.215 -0.367 * 0.348 0.348 0.371
[0.120] [0.180] [0.068] [0.240] [0.241] [0.216]
Earnings*Maturity * DI_mat 0.003 -0.008
[0.747] [0.803]
Earnings*Maturity * DD_mat -0.034 -0.013
[0.167] [0.496]
GS -0.016 0.123 * 0.117 * 0.116 0.110 0.099 0.053 0.097
[0.837] [0.090] [0.084] [0.159] [0.207] [0.406] [0.645] [0.424]
Earnings 0.055 0 -0.009 0.007 0.159 ** 0.163 ** 0.147 ** 0.166 **
[0.179] [0.996] [0.891] [0.917] [0.015] [0.016] [0.026] [0.014]
Constant -0.062 -0.474 -0.489 -0.454 1.034 ** 0.953 * 0.900 * 0.912
[0.898] [0.330] [0.319] [0.360] [0.039] [0.088] [0.099] [0.104]
Total Impact NPL -1.131 * -1.096
[0.053] [0.122]
Observations 176 121 121 121 157 78 78 78
Adjusted R-squared -0.002 -0.005 -0.006 -0.009 0.063 0.166 0.181 0.149
LONGER REPORTING LAGS SHORTER REPORTING LAGS
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Table 7: Robustness / Using the Market Model 
The table displays the results for the event window (-1, 0). The dependent variable is the Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns (CAR). The Abnormal Returns are computed using the market model. The data is quarterly. NPL is 
defined as quarterly changes in Non-performing Loans/Total Loans, Maturity as quarterly changes in gaps in 
months, Currency as quarterly changes in mismatch defined as FX Liabilities minus FX Assets to Total Assets 
and  GS  as  quarterly  changes  in  Government  Securities/Total  Assets.  Earnings is  defined  as  yearly  (same 
quarter of the preceding year) changes in Net Income before Extraordinary Items / Market Value of Equity. 
DI_mat denotes the dummy variable, equal to 1, if interest rates are expected to increase, and DD_mat if they 
are expected to decrease. DI_curr denotes the dummy variable, equal to 1, when the Turkish lira is expected to 
depreciate and DD_curr if the Turkish lira is expected to appreciate. To calculate the sign of the interest rate 
(exchange rate) expectations, we take the sign of the ex-post three-month change in the average deposit interest 
rates (exchange rates). Banks Act denotes the dummy equal to 1 after the introduction of new Banks Act. 
Specification 1 covers the full sample for 12 banks and the time period 1992/II-2001/III. NPL, and Maturity 
and Currency are included in the next specifications due to non-availability of data before 1995. The last 
specification including Currency covers only 8 banks that were consistent in their reporting. Regressions are 
pooled OLS with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and within cluster correlation. p- values are in 
parentheses. Asteriks indicate significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***). 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NPL -0.67 0.385 -0.682 -1.373 **
[0.153] [0.576] [0.159] [0.025]
NPL * Banks Act -1.585 *
[0.075]
Maturity * DI_mat -0.392 * -0.372 * -0.452 ** -0.367 *
[0.060] [0.072] [0.012] [0.087]
Maturity * DD_mat 0.001 0.054 -0.034 0.176
[0.995] [0.753] [0.853] [0.413]
Earnings*Maturity * DI_mat -0.022 **
[0.036]






GS 0.071 0.070 0.043 0.056 0.092
[0.273] [0.293] [0.503] [0.387] [0.298]
Earnings 0.107 *** 0.099 * 0.087 * 0.103 ** 0.112 *
[0.005] [0.062] [0.099] [0.037] [0.060]
Constant 0.273 0.252 0.229 0.258 0.492
[0.395] [0.501] [0.537] [0.488] [0.298]
Total Impact NPL -1.200 **
[0.040]
Observations 331 198 198 198 137
Adjusted R-squared 0.031 0.030 0.041 0.043 0.059
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Data Availability for the Banks 
The table displays listing periods of the banks on the Istanbul Stock Exchange. The listing periods are highlighted. A delisting of a bank indicates for its bankruptcy. Banks 
selected for the sample are marked in bold in the table 
 
  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Akbank 
 
                   
Alternatifbank 
 
      1995/II             
Demirbank 
 
                2000/III   
Disbank 
 
                   
Esbank 
 
              1999/III     
Finansbank 
 
                   
Garanti Bank 
 
                   
Isbank 
 
                   
Sekerbank 
 
          1997/II         
Tekstilbank 
 
                2000/I   
Yasarbank 
 
              1999/III     
Yapi ve Kredi 
Bankasi 
                   
Data Source: Istanbul Stock Exchange 
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Table A2: Event Dates for each Bank 
The table contains detailed information of banks’  financial statement disclosure dates. Instead of bank names (Akbank,  Alternatifbank,  Demirbank, Disbank, Esbank, 
Finansbank, Garanti Bankasi, Is Bankasi, Sekerbank, Tekstilbank, Yasarbank and Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi respectively) tickers in the Istanbul Stock Exchange are used in the 
table. For the quarters 1992/III and 1996/IV, there is no information available about the event date, and it is denoted by N/A. Tekstilbank and Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi have two 
additional missing event dates for 1996/II and 1997/II respectively. Blank cells explain that for Demirbank, Esbank and Yasarbank there is no data after their delisting. 
Alternatifbank and Sekerbank went public after 1995 and 1997 respectively. Confounding events of dividend payouts and equity issues which fall in the event window of [-5, 
+5] are marked in bold.  
 
  AKBNK  ALNTF  DEMIR  DISBA  ESBNK  FINBN  GARAN  ISCTR  SKBNK  TEKST  YABNK  YKBNK 
1992:1  24.04.1992    15.04.1992  29.04.1992  24.04.1992  21.04.1992  04.05.1992  30.04.1992    21.04.1992  04.05.1992  30.04.1992 
1992:2  17.07.1992    08.07.1992  22.07.1992  22.07.1992  07.07.1992  24.07.1992  10.08.1992    24.07.1992  07.08.1992  06.08.1992 
1992:3  N/A    N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A    N/A  N/A  N/A 
1992:4  15.03.1993    16.02.1993  19.02.1993  23.01.1993  09.02.1993  02.02.1993  12.03.1993    11.02.1993  09.02.1993  11.03.1993 
1993:1  26.04.1993    21.04.1993  26.04.1993  26.04.1993  26.04.1993  28.04.1993  30.04.1993    27.04.1993  29.04.1993  30.04.1993 
1993:2  20.07.1993    20.07.1993  20.07.1993  28.07.1993  20.07.1993  22.07.1993  05.08.1993    20.07.1993  03.08.1993  05.08.1993 
1993:3  19.10.1993    07.10.1993  11.10.1993  20.10.1993  18.10.1993  25.10.1993  28.10.1993    15.10.1993  25.10.1993  27.10.1993 
1993:4  28.03.1994    18.01.1994  24.01.1994  24.01.1994  23.03.1994  10.02.1994  21.02.1994    17.01.1994  25.02.1994  04.02.1994 
1994:1  25.04.1994    11.04.1994  12.04.1994  20.04.1994  08.04.1994  27.04.1994  25.04.1994    25.04.1994  26.04.1994  29.04.1994 
1994:2  11.08.1994    22.08.1994  29.08.1994  22.08.1994  22.08.1994  22.08.1994  06.09.1994    22.08.1994  23.08.1994  22.08.1994 
1994:3  24.10.1994    20.10.1994  25.10.1994  25.10.1994  17.10.1994  24.10.1994  26.10.1994    18.10.1994  01.11.1994  27.10.1994 
1994:4  15.03.1995    14.03.1995  08.03.1995  07.03.1995  14.02.1995  23.02.1995  14.03.1995    23.01.1995  17.02.1995  15.03.1995 
1995:1  15.05.1995    02.05.1995  18.05.1995  05.05.1995  01.05.1995  01.05.1995  09.05.1995    19.04.1995  04.05.1995  18.05.1995 
1995:2  01.08.1995  14.08.1995  01.08.1995  21.07.1995  31.08.1995  02.08.1995  04.08.1995  23.08.1995    08.08.1995  17.08.1995  25.08.1995 
1995:3  19.10.1995  09.11.1995  20.10.1995  16.10.1995  10.11.1995  03.11.1995  30.10.1995  30.10.1995    20.10.1995  08.11.1995  06.11.1995 
1995:4  12.02.1996  16.02.1996  19.01.1996  15.02.1996  21.03.1996  05.03.1996  01.03.1996  08.03.1996    18.01.1996  16.02.1996  07.03.1996 
1996:1  10.05.1996  10.05.1996  19.04.1996  12.04.1996  09.05.1996  10.05.1996  09.05.1996  10.05.1996    08.05.1996  10.05.1996  10.05.1996 
1996:2  12.08.1996  16.08.1996  23.07.1996  16.08.1996  13.08.1996  16.08.1996  16.08.1996  23.08.1996    N/A  21.08.1996  22.08.1996 
1996:3  31.10.1996  08.11.1996  06.11.1996  08.11.1996  11.11.1996  11.11.1996  06.11.1996  11.11.1996    07.11.1996  11.11.1996  08.11.1996 
1996:4  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
1997:1  13.05.1997  14.05.1997  13.05.1997  12.05.1997  13.05.1997  13.05.1997  07.05.1997  12.05.1997  12.05.1997  13.05.1997  13.05.1997  12.05.1997 
1997:2  14.08.1997  27.08.1997  14.08.1997  28.08.1997  19.08.1997  22.08.1997  14.08.1997  14.08.1997  29.08.1997  05.09.1997  19.08.1997  N/A 
1997:3  04.11.1997  10.11.1997  07.11.1997  12.11.1997  10.11.1997  06.11.1997  04.11.1997  10.11.1997  10.11.1997  01.11.1997  06.11.1997  10.11.1997 
1997:4  16.03.1998  11.02.1998  27.02.1998  16.02.1998  28.01.1998  03.03.1998  17.02.1998  02.03.1998  13.03.1998  20.01.1998  13.03.1998  13.03.1998 
1998:1  29.04.1998  11.05.1998  06.05.1998  02.05.1998  11.05.1998  24.04.1998  13.05.1998  13.05.1998  13.05.1998  13.05.1998  11.05.1998  13.05.1998 
1998:2  01.10.1998  29.09.1998  06.10.1998  01.10.1998  05.10.1998  05.10.1998  05.10.1998  01.10.1998  02.10.1998  07.10.1998  01.10.1998  05.10.1998 
1998:3  26.10.1998  04.11.1998  26.10.1998  14.10.1998  12.11.1998  02.11.1998  22.10.1998  13.11.1998  12.11.1998  16.10.1998  10.11.1998  09.11.1998 






Table A2 continued: 
 
  AKBNK  ALNTF  DEMIR  DISBA  ESBNK  FINBN  GARAN  ISCTR  SKBNK  TEKST  YABNK  YKBNK 
1999:1  27.04.1999  03.05.1999  15.04.1999  14.05.1999  13.05.1999  10.05.1999  26.04.1999  10.05.1999  13.05.1999  29.04.1999  14.05.1999  07.05.1999 
1999:2  09.08.1999  18.08.1999  11.08.1999  20.07.1999  27.08.1999  05.08.1999  29.07.1999  13.08.1999  26.08.1999  27.07.1999  27.08.1999  13.08.1999 
1999:3  21.10.1999  10.11.1999  03.11.1999  11.10.1999  12.11.1999  09.11.1999  20.10.1999  28.10.1999  12.11.1999  20.10.1999  03.11.1999  27.10.1999 
1999:4  15.02.2000  18.01.2000  03.02.2000  12.01.2000    21.02.2000  28.01.2000  15.02.2000  03.03.2000  12.01.2000  31.03.2000  25.02.2000 
2000:1  02.05.2000  28.04.2000  18.04.2000  10.04.2000    10.05.2000  21.04.2000  05.05.2000  11.05.2000  19.04.2000    02.05.2000 
2000:2  24.08.2000  18.08.2000  14.08.2000  07.08.2000    18.08.2000  17.08.2000  15.08.2000  25.08.2000  18.08.2000    23.08.2000 
2000:3  31.10.2000  09.11.2000  01.11.2000  01.11.2000    08.11.2000  02.11.2000  13.11.2000  13.11.2000  09.11.2000    10.11.2000 
2000:4  13.02.2001  28.02.2001    22.01.2001    22.02.2001  05.02.2001  15.02.2001  02.03.2001  20.02.2001    19.02.2001 
2001:1  19.04.2001  11.05.2001    01.05.2001    30.04.2001  11.05.2001  11.05.2001  11.05.2001  11.05.2001    11.05.2001 
2001:2  07.08.2001  24.08.2001    14.08.2001    24.08.2001  24.08.2001  15.08.2001  24.08.2001  24.08.2001    24.08.2001 
2001:3  30.10.2001  09.11.2001    15.10.2001    09.11.2001  09.11.2001  09.11.2001  09.11.2001  09.11.2001    09.11.2001 
Data Source: Istanbul Stock Exchange 
 
 
 
 